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Dixie Schrieber and Scott Shanahan began dating in 1983.  On May 10, 2004, 
Dixie Schrieber Shanahan was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment for the murder of 
Scott Shanahan.  In between, there was a marriage, children-- and years of horrendous 
abuse.  During the 19 years that Dixie and Scott Shanahan were together, Scott Shanahan 
blackened Dixie’s eyes, bruised her, threatened her, dragged her by her hair, pointed guns 
at her, tied her up and left her for days in the basement, called her vile names, degraded 
her in front of friends, and generally made her life a living hell.  On August 30, 2002, 
believing that her life and the life of her unborn child were in danger, after days of 
beatings and threats and the promise, “This day is not over yet.  I will kill you,” Dixie 
Shanahan shot her husband while he lay in bed.  After less than one day of deliberation, a 
jury found Dixie Shanahan guilty of second degree murder. The Honorable Charles L. 
Smith III sentenced Dixie Shanahan to 50 years imprisonment.
The community of Defiance, Iowa, divided sharply around the prosecution of 
Dixie Shanahan.  During the trial, both prosecution and defense witnesses agreed that
3Scott Shanahan was an extremely violent man who brutally abused his wife for years.
But members of the community debated whether Dixie Shanahan was justified in killing 
her abuser.  Some characterized Dixie Shanahan’s actions as a final desperate attempt to 
save herself and her baby, others conceded the severity of the abuse she endured over the 
years but maintained that she had no right to take Scott Shanahan’s life.1
Accept, for the sake of argument, that Dixie Shanahan was guilty of second 
degree murder in the shooting death of her husband, Scott—that the prosecution proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that she shot her husband and that that shooting was not 
justified.2  Was the punishment that Dixie Shanahan received in this case just?  Fifty 
years imprisonment, with a requirement that she serve thirty-five years before becoming 
eligible for parole.  Nineteen years of abuse, followed by, essentially, a lifetime in jail .  
Members of the jury expressed dismay at the sentence; some jurors had assumed that 
Shanahan would be sentenced to twenty-five years and serve, at most, eight years.3
Criminal punishment in America has been justified by philosophers employing a 
number of theories.  Chief among these are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
1 See Letters to the Editor, DES MOINES REGISTER, June 8, 2004 (including letters stating “If you have not 
been in her position, you cannot know the feeling of helplessness that would drive you to protect yourself 
and your children by such desperate means,” and “Sounds like murder to me.  And now she’s going to pay 
a murderer’s penalty.  All’s well with the justice system.”); Shanahan punished by husband and state, DES 
MOINES REGISTER, May 5, 2004 (including letters to the editor both for and against Dixie Shanahan); see 
also John Ferak, Kids’ fate uncertain after verdict, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 1, 2004 (quoting 
residents of Defiance on the Shanahan verdict).
2 Shanahan never denied that she shot her husband, but did argue that her actions were justified.  Tr. at  
812-23.  The jury rejected that argument, apparently because Shanahan followed her husband into the 
bedroom and shot him in the back while he was laying in bed, during a lull in the abuse.  Jurors did not 
believe that Shanahan was in imminent danger and had no other option but to kill in self-defense.   For a 
discussion of the difficulties battered women who kill face in making self-defense cases, see generally Kit 
Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 
S.L.U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2004).
3
 Staci Hupp, Judge gives Shanahan up to 50 years, expresses frustration with rigid laws, DES MOINES 
REGISTER, May 11, 2004.
4incapacitation.4  Each of these could potentially serve as a rational e for punishing Dixie 
Shanahan.  Closer examination of her case, and the cases of other battered women who 
kill, however, raises the question of whether these rationales make sense in the context of 
these cases.  Are the punishments meted out to these women just?5  This article 
approaches that question by discussing each of the rationales for criminal punishment in 
turn and applying them to the case of Dixie Shanahan.  Would punishing Dixie Shanahan 
deter future crime—either by her or other battered women?  Does her punishment serve 
some retributive function?  Will Dixie Shanahan be rehabilitated as a result of her 
punishment?  Is Dixie Shanahan’s incapacitation for thirty-five years just?  Examination 
of each of these rationales reveals that only one, retributivism, provides sufficient 
justification for punishing Dixie Shanahan and other battered women who kill, and only 
to the extent that they receive their just deserts, punishments proportionate to the crime, 
considering the entire context for the crime.  Because the fifty year sentence she received
is not a just desert, the punishment actually imposed on Dixie Shanahan was not just.
Like many battered women who kill, Dixie Shanahan received an unjust sentence.  
In Dixie Shanahan’s case, that injustice was largely a function of mandatory minimum 
sentences.  Though he agreed with the verdict, denying a defense motion for a new trial, 
Judge Smith was frustrated by his lack of sentencing options.  At sentencing, Judge Smith 
4
 Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach 
to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 162-65 (1995-96).
5
 Abbe Smith has remarked on the speed with which advocates for battered women decry the convictions of 
battered women who kill but show little interest in defending other victims accused of crimes (like Aileen 
Wuornos, who killed several men after years of abuse as a prostitute). Abbe Smith, The Monster In All of 
Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 367 (2005).  While this article falls 
squarely within that critique, it does so mindfully.  Similar arguments about the justice of individual 
punishments and the failure to consider the context for their crimes in imposing punishment could be made 
about any number of offenders involved with the criminal system; as Smith notes, “It is the rare serious 
perpetrator who was not also a victim….it is the rare perpetrator who has not also suffered.”  Id. at 369.  
Smith further argues that context is essential for understanding not only the victim’s actions, but also her 
abuser’s, asserting that the same social and political conditions that give rise to violence against women 
also give rise to violence by men.  Id. at 392.
5told Dixie Shanahan that because of mandatory minimum sentences enacted by the 
legislature, he did not have the ability to impose a lighter sentence (like probation) or 
suspend her sentence—punishments he believed more appropriate.  He stated, “The 
matter of this case is a tragedy in every sense.  You suffered years of abuse.  One person 
is dead, and now you face a lifetime in prison, and none of that is necessary.”6  While the 
fifty year sentence was legal, according to Smith it was also “wrong.”7  Left without 
alternatives, Judge Smith was unable to exercise any discretion in sentencing, despite the 
years of abuse Dixie Shanahan suffered and despite his belief that a long period of 
incarceration was inappropriate.
But what accounts for the injustice done to battered women who kill in 
jurisdictions without such stringent sentencing requirements?  In those cases, judicial 
skepticism about evidence of abuse and (unfounded) fears of an epidemic of homicides 
may drive judges to impose unjust sentences.  Judges either refuse to hear evidence about 
the battering these women have suffered or hear that evidence but refuse to consider the 
crime in the context of the abuse.  Either way, crucial information that would lead to the 
imposition of a “just desert” is excluded from sentencing decisions.  Finally, concerns 
about the impact of failing to impose stringent sentences on women who kill their abusive 
partners drive judges to mete out unjust sentences.  
For Dixie Shanahan, as for other battered women who kill, there is no justice.
Context—examining the lives of Dixie Shanahan and other women like her, and asking 
how they come to the point where killing their batterers seems to be their only option—is 
6
 Transcript, State of Iowa v. Dixie Lynn Shanahan, May 10, 2004, at 8.
7
 Id.
6crucial to establish why most traditional rationales for criminal punishment are 
inadequate in these cases.  This article begins with that context.
I. The Life of Dixie Shanahan
Dixie Schrieber was born in Muscatine, Iowa in 1967.8  In 1976, Schrieber’s mother 
married a man named Frank Street, who sexually abused Dixie and her three sisters for 
years until Dixie threatened to report the abuse to police.9  In 1984, the same year that 
Dixie threatened to report her stepfather, she moved to Defiance, Iowa, to live with Al 
and Beverly Feser, the parents of Scott Shanahan, whom she had begun dating in 1983.10
Both of the Fesers had physical infirmities.  Dixie cared for and developed close, loving 
relationships with them; in fact, Dixie said that Beverly was more like a mother to her 
than her own mother.11
From the beginning of their relationship, Scott verbally and physically abused Dixie.  
Although Dixie described this abuse as minor compared to what she would later 
experience, in those early years Scott was already beating her so severely that she was 
bruised.12  But Dixie was not his only victim; Scott also physically abused his mother, 
Beverly, who had a heart condition and had undergone triple bypass surgery.13  Dixie 
described Scott’s temper as unpredictable and likely to explode over trivial matters, like 
8
 Transcript, State of Iowa v. Dixie Shanahan, Case No. FECR006475, at 437-38.
9 Tr. at 438-39.  Battered women frequently come from homes where they have been physically or sexually 
abused as children.  LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 8-9 (1984).
10 Tr. at 440, 442.
11
 Tr. at 440-42.
12 Tr. at 443-44.  Battering often increases in severity over time.  AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 6 (1996).
13 Tr. at 442-43.
7the lawnmower failing to start.14  In 1986, Scott beat Dixie for visiting her family, who 
she had not seen since she moved to the Fesers’ home in 1984. 15
In 1988, Scott’s mother developed pneumonia after attending her brother-in-law’s 
funeral; Scott reacted by beating Beverly so severely that she was bruised from head to 
toe.16  Around this time, Beverly extracted a promise from Dixie that if anything ever 
happened to her, Dixie would take care of Scott—a promise that Dixie took seriously 
given the closeness of her relationship with Beverly.17  During that same period of time, 
Dixie estimates that Scott was beating both her and Beverly about twice a week.18  Each 
time Scott experienced adversity—his mother’s sickness, the death of his grandfather in 
1993—the beatings worsened.19  In 1994, when Beverly died, Scott “went off the 
wall…beating [Dixie] more frequently about anything.”20
In 1995, Dixie Schrieber married Scott Shanahan; in 1996, their son Zachary was 
born, followed by Ashley in 1998.  Scott was unhappy about the first pregnancy, 
worrying that they had no experience caring for a child and that Dixie, the sole 
breadwinner, would have to stop working.21  During Dixie’s second pregnancy, after 
Dixie refused to have an abortion, Scott beat her in the stomach, telling her that he was 
going to get rid of the baby.22
14 Tr. at 444.
15 Tr. at 447.  Batterers seek to isolate their victims from sources of support, like family members, in order 
to increase their control.  PATRICIA GAGNÉ, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE: THE MOVEMENT FOR 
CLEMENCY AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 19 (1998).
16 Tr. at 451.
17 Tr. at 452.
18 Tr. at 453.
19 Tr. at 456.
20 Tr. at 457.
21 Tr. at 448.
22 Tr. at 458-59.  A co-worker of Dixie’s confirmed that when Dixie was eight months pregnant with 
Ashley, she saw bruises and red marks on Dixie’s stomach, which Dixie told her Scott had caused.  Tr. at 
658-59.  Battering often begins or increases in intensity when the victim becomes pregnant, and the fetus is 
frequently a target of the beatings.  Donna St. George, Many New or Expectant Mothers Die Violent 
8Despite her promise to Beverly, Dixie left Scott on a number of occasions, beginning 
in 1997.  But she always remembered that promise and felt badly for leaving. “I had 
promised I would take care of him and I felt I wasn’t doing that for her.”23 Dixie also 
worried about her children growing up without a father.24 Each time she left, Scott would 
call Dixie, her family, and her friends relentlessly, asking her to come back and her 
friends to urge her to do so.25  He promised to change, to get counseling, “to do whatever 
it took to keep our marriage together.”26  And each time, Scott would change for a few 
months, would go to counseling and take his medication.27 But the beatings always
resumed, becoming more severe, causing more serious injury.28
Although the beatings were a regular feature of Dixie’s life with Scott, a number of 
particularly horrible incidents stood out in her testimony.  The time that Scott threw her 
down the basement steps, chipping her front teeth (which remained chipped at the time of 
her trial, a number of years later). 29  The time that Scott stuck her head in a toilet and told 
her that he would flush her head down the toilet, while her children watched.30  The time 
Deaths, WASHINGTON POST, December 19, 2004, at A1; Donna St. George, Researchers Stunned by Scope 
of Slayings: Further Studies Needed, Most Agree, WASHINGTON POST, December 19, 2004, at A21.
23 Tr. at 457-58.
24 Tr. at 457.  Many victims cite concern for their children as a reason for remaining in an abusive 
relationship.  ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 110 (1987).
25
 Co-workers and friends testified that Scott called repeatedly, asking and then demanding information 
about Dixie’s whereabouts.  Tr. at 675-76, 683.
26 Tr. at 449-50, 459-60, 473-74. 
27 Tr. at 459 461-62, 474.
28 Tr. at 450, 462.  In the classic cycle of violence described by Dr. Lenore Walker in her 1984 book THE 
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, the acute battering phase is followed by a honeymoon phase, during which 
the batterer vows to change and shows remorse for his behavior.  While he may exhibit a short-term 
change, most frequently the violence begins again—and increases in intensity.  WALKER, supra note 9, at 
95-104.
29 Tr. at 460.
30 Tr. at 461.
9that Scott beat her on the top of the head with a cowboy boot.31 The time that Scott, 
angry about a red t-shirt that Dixie was wearing, poked her in the eye, causing the eye to 
bleed.32 The three times that Scott tied Dixie up, leaving her in their basement for up to 
two days, not allowing her to go to the bathroom, telling her, “You know, I could let you 
just sit here and die…and nobody would know the difference.”33
Two doors in the Shanahan home were damaged when Scott smashed Dixie’s head 
into them—damage that still existed at the time of her trial.34  Scott smashed a plate of 
mashed potatoes over Dixie’s head, complaining that they were runny.35  He ran over her 
legs with a lawn tractor.36  He bit her, leaving a huge bruise on her leg.37  He threw tools 
at her face, causing a black eye.38  All of these incidents were in addition to the regular 
beatings.  And Scott verbally abused Dixie both privately and publicly, telling her friends 
they should teach her to be better in bed because she was terrible, that she was no good, 
worthless.39
31 Tr. at 461.  A co-worker, Kristy Wessel, testified that Dixie told her she had a terrible headache as a 
result of being beaten with a cowboy boot. Wessel touched the top of Dixie’s head and felt a number of 
lumps there that were painful to the touch.  Tr. at 673-74.
32 Tr. at 469.
33 Tr. at 466-68.  Two of these incidents followed Dixie’s statements that she was going to leave Scott.  
Violence often increases when the victim attempts to separate from her batterer; the batterer perceives he is 
losing control and uses physical violence to reinforce his control over his victim.  See generally Martha K. 
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1991).
34 Tr. at 463-64.
35 Tr. at 476.
36 Tr. id.
37 Tr .id.
38 Tr. at 477.
39 Tr.id.  Numerous witnesses testified to Scott’s reputation for anger and the injuries they observed on 
Dixie.  Tr. at 615-19, 623-24, 628-29, 636, 641-42, 648-49, 652-55.  Co-workers testified, and Dixie 
confirmed, that she always wore long sleeves to work in the summer to cover the bruises on her arms.  Tr. 
at 632, 677.  The Shanahan’s neighbor testified that on more than one occasion she heard Scott yelling 
obscenities and threats at another person and a female voice screaming in pain.  Tr. at 687-88.
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Although Dixie recalled being beaten regularly over the course of their relationship, 
she reported the abuse to the police on only three occasions, the first in May of 1997.40
After punching her in the face, slamming her head into the window of their car, he 
threatened to take their son, Zachary, and leave so that Dixie would never see the boy
again.41  On that occasion, Scott pled guilty to domestic abuse assault and was sentenced 
to 30 days in jail with all but two days suspended and with credit for time served.42 On 
September 8, 1997, Dixie again asked the police for help after Scott struck her head and 
legs with a metal object, causing her to bleed from the ear.43 Dixie told police at that 
time that she was pregnant and afraid that Scott would cause her to lose the baby.44 Scott 
pled guilty to domestic abuse assault (an aggravated misdemeanor) and was sentenced to 
two years in the state penitentiary with all but four days suspended.45
40 Tr. at 445.  Aaron Anderson, a former Shelby County deputy sheriff, confirmed that Dixie Shanahan 
called for assistance on May 31, 1997, after Scott Shanahan back-handed Dixie across the face with a 
closed fist, causing bruising under the eye and a bloody lip.  He also recalled Dixie telling him that the 
abuse had been going on for some time.  Tr. at 178-80.  Scott Shanahan was arrested the following day.  
Police had also received an earlier report, on November 19, 1996, from an attorney in Harlan telling them 
to take any report of domestic abuse from the Shanahan home seriously.  Tr. at 206.  That report came from 
Susan Christensen.  Tr. at 709.  Her testimony will be discussed further in Part II, infra.
41 Tr. at 446.
42
 Tr. at 216.  A no contact order was entered in the case; Dixie requested that that order be lifted in July 
1997, saying “I am no longer afraid that I will—that he will hurt me and I would like to keep my marriage 
together and with the restraining order this is not possible to try.  He is in counciling (sic) now and I feel 
this is helping him.  We have a nine month old son so if at all possible I would like this lifted so we can 
work this out.”  The court lifted the order the next day.  Tr. at 217.
43
 Tr. at 186-87.
44
 Tr. at 205.
45
 Tr. at 222.  Dixie had asked for the charges against Scott to be dropped, stating, “I know he has been 
attending his BEP classes as required and also on his own has been seeing a councler (sic) and a 
psychiatrist so he has been—so he is making every effort to get help.  I cannot see where jail time would be 
beneficial to him at all.  In all fairness some of the things I said were exaggerated and this whole thing has 
been blown out of proportion.”  Tr. at 221.  On cross-examination, Vicky Krohn, the clerk of court for 
Shelby County, acknowledged that many victims of violence ask that domestic violence complaints be 
dismissed, a point Susan Christenson also grudgingly conceded.  Tr. at 730-31..  In fact, victim reluctance 
to assist with prosecution is so common that prosecutors developed “victimless” prosecution techniques in 
order to proceed with domestic violence cases even when the victim declines to cooperate.  See, e.g., 
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Cases, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860-65 (1996).
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The final police interaction with the Shanahans prior to August 2002 occurred on 
October 9, 2000.46  Dixie’s friends tried to enter the home; Scott would not let them in 
and they called the police.  When the deputies arrived, Scott refused to open the door and 
put Dixie and the children in a closet, holding the door closed with his foot.  A friend 
remembered, however, that Dixie kept a key hidden in back of the house and the deputies 
used the key to enter and arrest Scott.47 Deputy Sheriff Mark Hervey observed that Dixie 
had two black eyes.  Dixie told Hervey that one had been caused when Scott threw a 
VCR tape at her; the other resulted from being poked in the eye.48  Dixie also showed 
Deputy Hervey the hole in the door that Scott made with her head.49  Deputies arrested 
Scott and charged him with false imprisonment and felony domestic abuse assault with 
injury.50 Dixie fled to Texas, where she stayed until April 2001.   In the interim, Scott
repeatedly contacted her in violation of the no contact order entered in the criminal 
case,51 begged her to come back, and threatened to kill himself.  Scott finally went to 
Texas to convince Dixie that he could be a good husband and to tell her that he had 
hepatitis A and was going to die.52  Dixie refused to return to Defiance to testify against 
Scott, and the charges against him were dismissed.53  But after Scott’s repeated entreaties, 
Dixie later returned to Defiance.
46
 Tr. at 189-92.
47 Tr. at 470-72.
48
 Tr. at 191.
49
 Tr. at 193
50
 Tr. at 196.
51
 Tr. at 209.  Deputy Hervey testified that he knew Scott had been contacting Dixie in Texas, in violation 
of the no contact order.  Id.  Teresa Merritt, a friend of Dixie’s testified that while Dixie was in Texas, Scott 
admitted to beating Dixie and the children and tying Dixie up in the basement and said he didn’t blame her 
for leaving.  Tr. at 642.
52 Tr. at 472-74.  Deputy Sheriff John Kelly testified that on Christmas Eve, 2000, he responded to a call 
about a suicide threat at the Shanahan residence.  Kelly found Scott Shanahan there, alone, visibly upset 
and shaking, saying that he had nothing to live for because Dixie was not there and if he did not get her 
back.  Tr. at 277-79.
53
 Tr. at 199.
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By August 2002, Dixie was being physically abused three to four times weekly, 
leaving her badly bruised.54  She also learned that once again, she was pregnant.  Scott, 
enraged, demanded that she have an abortion.  Dixie refused.55 Scott repeatedly beat 
Dixie and told her that she was not going to have the baby, that he would make sure that 
she would not have the baby, and that there was nothing she could do about it.56  On 
August 30, angry because Dixie failed to wake him before their son, Zachary, left for the 
school bus, Scott began beating Dixie’s stomach, screaming, “I’m gonna’ kill this baby 
one way or another” while their daughter, Ashley, watched.57  Dixie sent Ashley to a 
friend’s house and tried to leave the house herself.  Scott took her car keys, knocked her 
to the ground and dragged her into the house by her hair, pulling chunks of hair out of her 
head.  He then punched her stomach again, screaming that she would not have the baby.58
Scott left the room as Dixie lay on the floor crying.  He returned with a shotgun, 
enraged, visibly shaking and calling Dixie obscene names.  He jammed two different 
shells into the gun, then pointed the gun at Dixie, and said, “This day is not over yet.  I 
will kill you.”59  Dixie was sure that he would shoot her, but he didn’t; instead, Scott 
began beating her again, threatening to kill her and the baby.60  At some point, Scott also 
removed the phones from their jacks.  When he stopped beating Dixie, he went into the 
bedroom, taking the phones with him.  The only working phone was in the bedroom with 
him.61
54 Tr. at 479-80.
55 Tr. at 480.
56 Tr. at 481.
57 Tr. at 483.
58 Tr. at 484-85.
59 Tr. at 485-87.  The prosecution suggested that Dixie, who had no experience with shotguns, accidentally 
loaded the gun with the two different sized shells prior to shooting Scott.  Tr. at 789-90.
60
 Tr. at 487.
61
 Tr. at 488.
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Dixie decided she needed to call the police and went into the bedroom to attempt to 
use the phone.  As she tried to grab the phone, Scott moved towards her.  Seeing the
shotgun near the phone, Dixie grabbed it, closed her eyes, and shot Scott.62  Dixie 
testified that she believed that Scott was coming for her again and that she had no other 
choice, that the only way to protect herself and her unborn child was to shoot Scott 
Shanahan.63  She then sat in a chair outside the bedroom for a few hours, wondering what 
she was going to do.  Ultimately, she put the gun in the closet of the children’s bedroom, 
shut the door to the bedroom where Scott lay, dead, on the bed, put a towel underneath 
the door, and went back to the chair, where she sat until her daughter came home that 
afternoon.64  She never told anyone that Scott was in the bedroom, where he remained
until the police searched her home on October 20, 2003.65
II. Dixie Shanahan in the Context of Battered Women Who Kill
Dixie Shanahan’s case became notorious because Scott lay dead in the back bedroom 
of her home for eighteen months while she and her children continued to live in the 
house.  Without that sensational detail, her story would not have been significantly 
different from those of the thousands of other women currently serving sentences for 
killing their abusive partners.  What transforms these women from victims of severe 
abuse to killers?
A   Understanding Battered Women Who Kill
Studies consistently find that large percentages of the women incarcerated for murder 
or manslaughter are in prison because they killed intimate partners who had abused 
62
 Tr. at 553.  The prosecution contended that Scott was asleep on the bed when Dixie killed him; Dixie 
repeatedly  testified that Scott was awake and made a move toward her.  Id. at 555, 559, 561, 564.
63
 Tr. at 489-90.
64
 Tr. at 490-92.
65
 Tr. at 200.
14
them.66 Many of these women—like Dixie Shanahan-- are first time offenders who have 
no prior history of violence.67
Battered women who kill share a number of characteristics.  Few have resorted to 
violence against their abusers in the past.  As Angela Browne notes, “Women charged in 
the death of a mate have the least extensive criminal records of any female offenders.”68
Most have endured repeated, severe abuse over a period of years.69  At some point, the 
violence against them escalated to a level where the battered woman believed that if she 
did not kill her abuser, she would be killed.70 Lenore Walker explains, “Battered women 
who kill their abusers do so as a last resort.”71 Sue Ostoff, who has represented more 
than 350 women who have killed their abusers, agrees.  “I’ve met only one woman who 
wanted to kill her husband.  Battered women don’t want to do it.  And they won’t do it if 
they don’t absolutely have to.”72 One battered woman who killed her partner described 
her experience: “I would have been dead, in a short time, Tommy would have killed me.  
I know he would have.  I know he would have.”73
Battered women who kill have frequently tried to leave their abusers but found that 
police, clergy, courts, shelters or other resources were either not available or not helpful 
66 See, e.g., TRACY HULING, BREAKING THE SILENCE 3 (1991); CHRISTOPHER A. INNES & LAWRENCE A. 
GREENFELD, VIOLENT STATE PRISONERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 6 (1990); Kathleen O’Shea, Women on Death 
Row, in WOMEN PRISONERS: A FORGOTTEN POPULATION 81, 85 (Fletcher et al, eds. 1993); Suzanne
Rotonda, Battered Women in Prison: Statistics and Update, OUT OF TIME, February 1993, at 3.  Of the 
70,300 women incarcerated in state prisons in 1999, just over 11% were in prison for homicide.  ALLEN J. 
BECK, PRISONERS IN 1999 10 (2000).
67 HULING, id.
68 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 11.
69 GAGNÉ, supra note 15, at 24 .
70
 Linda L. Ammons, Dealing with the Nastiness: Mixing Feminism and Criminal Law in the Review of 
Cases of Battered Incarcerated Women—A Tenth-Year Reflection, 4 B UFF. CRIM. L. REV. 891, 913 (2001); 
GAGNÉ, supra note 15, at 28.
71 LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 5 
(1989).
72 ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 346-47 (1996).
73 AMY LOU BUSCH, FINDING THEIR VOICES: LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN WHO’VE KILLED 53 (1999).
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in stopping the violence.74  And battered women are aware of the tenuous nature of the 
protection available through the legal system.  They read newspaper stories and watch 
television accounts about women who have called the police and obtained orders of 
protection, only to be killed by their abusers.75  “When ‘media tragedies’ like these hit the 
news, battered women get the message: the system that fails to protect them from assault 
at home will not protect them when they leave.”76
Angela Browne identifies a number of variables that make battered women more 
likely to kill their partners.  These include the increased frequency of abusive incidents,
the severity of the woman’s injuries, the frequency of forced or threatened sexual acts,
the man’s drug use or frequent intoxication, an increase in the man’s threats to kill, and 
74 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 159, 170; GAGNÉ, supra note 15, at 26-27.  One study suggests that battered 
women leave but return to their relationships unwillingly—because of threats or further violence, for their 
children, or because they have no other place to go.  JONES, supra note 72, at 297.  For a discussion of 
barriers to leaving abusive relationships, see BROWNE, id. at 109-28; GAGNÉ, id. at 81-82.
75
  Legislators in North Carolina have crafted an ironic solution to this problem.  Recognizing that a 
protective order “[t]oo often…amounts to a useless piece of paper,” North Carolina recently passed a law 
making it easier for victims of domestic violence to obtain emergency concealed handgun permits so long 
as the sheriff agrees.  Gun May Raise Risks, GREENSBORO (N.C.) NEWS & RECORD, August 20, 2005 at A8.  
Governor Mike Easley signed the bill, but asked the legislature to remove language that required court 
clerks to inform women getting protective orders about the provision.  Amy Gardner, Domestic Violence 
Bill Signed: But Easley Is Uneasy About Telling Victims How To Apply for a Concealed Gun Permit, NEWS 
& OBSERVER, August 30, 2005.  Of course, if these women choose to use their weapons to protect 
themselves, they may find themselves in the same situation as Dixie Shanahan and other battered women 
who have killed, trying to persuade juries that their lives were in imminent danger.  See also Joan Ryan, A 
Woman, A Batterer and a Gun, January 8, 2006, available on-line at…(describing how a battered woman 
who carried a concealed weapon was convicted of carrying a loaded gun when her protective order 
expired).
76 JONES, supra note 72, at 343-45.  Yvette Cade’s case provides a graphic, horrifying example.  On 
September 19, 2005, Judge Richard A. Palumbo vacated Yvette Cade’s protective order against her 
husband, Roger Hargrave.  Ms. Cade pleaded with the judge not to lift the order, telling the judge that her 
husband continued to terrorize her and her daughter.  When Ms. Cade told the judge that she wanted to 
divorce her husband (instead of entering counseling with him, as Mr. Hargrave had suggested in his motion 
to vacate the order), Judge Palumbo responded that he wanted “to be six-foot-five, but that’s not what we 
do here.” Judge Palumbo told Ms. Cade that she needed to hire an attorney and go to divorce court—
ignoring that her pleas for continued protection related not to her desire for a divorce, but to the violence 
against her--and dismissed the order that Ms. Cade obtained in July.  Three weeks later, Mr. Hargrave 
entered the T-Mobile store where Ms. Cade worked, poured gasoline on her, and set her on fire.  Ms. Cade 
remains hospitalized with third degree burns to her face and more than half of her upper body.   See Allison 
Klein and Ruben Castaneda, Md. Victim of Burning Told Judge of Fears, WASHINGTON POST, October 13, 
2005, at B1; see also Betty Cuniberti, Kelli Alexander did everything right.  Did it have to cost her life?, 
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, March 2, 2005, at E1.
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the woman’s threats of suicide.77 Battered women who kill frequently report the 
destruction of their pets; these women believe that the murder of a pet represents their 
own imminent deaths.78 All of these variables point to the escalating danger these
women perceived and their increasing beliefs that they would be unable to escape.  
Browne explains, 
[T]he women’s behavior seemed to be primarily in reaction to the level of threat and 
violence coming in.  Women in the homicide group reported that they had felt 
hopelessly trapped in a desperate situation, in which staying meant the possibility of 
being killed, but attempting to leave also carried with it the threat of reprisal or death.  
Their sense of helplessness and desperation escalated along with the assaultive 
behavior of their partners.79
Browne uses social judgment theory to explain the thought processes of battered 
women before they kill.  Browne argues that a “latitude of acceptance” defines what 
battered women believe that they can live through.  The parameters of that latitude 
constantly shift to assimilate attacks that previously they would not have believed they 
could survive.  When acts occur that the women perceive as significantly outside of the 
“normal” range of violence (a change in the pattern of violence, or more brutal behavior) 
or that is beyond the range of what they can assimilate (like child abuse), that “contrast 
phenomena” indicates to the women that their deaths are imminent.  At that moment, 
“their final hope had been removed.  They did not believe they could escape the abusive 
situation and survive, and now they could no longer survive within it either.”80
Battered women are particularly likely to kill when they perceive that their own lives 
or the lives of their children are immediately imperiled.81 This fight or flight response 
77 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 127.
78 Id. at 157.
79 Id.
80 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 128-29.
81 GAGNÉ, supra note 15, at 24.
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should be seen as psychologically normal, Lenore Walker argues; “[d]efending oneself 
from reasonably perceived imminent danger of bodily harm or death ought to be 
considered a psychologically healthy response.”82 But the women don’t necessarily make 
a conscious decision to save themselves at the expense of their partners; while they may 
have had “an absolute conviction that death was inevitable within a certain timeframe,” 
the women usually believed that they or their children, and not the abuser, would be the 
victims if someone died.83  As Angela Browne explains, “Typically the killing of the 
abuser was unplanned and occurred in the midst of an attack against the woman, during 
the warning phase when it became apparent that an attack was about to begin, or during 
an escape attempt by the woman.”84 And what of battered women who kill their partners 
after an attack or while they sleep?  Browne explains that “[t]hese delayed homicides 
were often related to an explicit threat by the abuser to ‘get’ the woman or a child within 
a specific time; women killed the abuser to avert the threatened outcome.”85
The abuser’s power over a battered woman who kills may be so great that the woman 
continues to believe the abuser is dangerous even after he is dead and takes measures to 
protect herself.  As Angela Browne notes, “One woman locked her husband’s body in the 
closet after she shot him: As long as she could see him, she was afraid he was going to 
reach out and grab her.”86  Lenore Walker states, “Even after a homicide, denial and the 
battered woman’s belief in the omniscience of her batterer serve to deaden death’s 
82 WALKER, supra note 71, at 169.
83 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 135.
84 Id. at 135-36.  A review of the social science literature suggests that over 70% of battered women who 
kill do so either during an attack or when facing imminent death or serious bodily injury; the number may 
be closer to 90%.  Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 384 (1991).
85 Id.  One commentator suggests that battered women kill when their partners are sleeping or not 
expecting to be attacked to overcome differences in physical size and strength.  Book Summary: More Than 
Victims: Battered Women, The Syndrome Society, and the Law, 20 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 43, 44 (1998).
86 Id. at 141.
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effect.”87  When they are able to come to grips with what they have done, however, 
battered women who kill most often report feeling sorrow and horror at the deaths of 
their partners.88
B.  Dixie Shanahan as a “Typical” Battered Woman Who Kills
If such a thing as a “typical” battered woman who kills exists, Dixie Shanahan seems 
to be one.  She was a first time offender with no history of violence; she was a nurturing 
women whose work involved caring for the elderly and frail in nursing homes.  Scott 
Shanahan abused her for the entire nineteen years of their relationship, abuse that 
escalated in both frequency and severity over time.  Dixie repeatedly tried to leave Scott, 
turning to family and friends for assistance, fleeing the state, but ultimately being begged 
and bullied back to him each time, with her promise to his mother Bev echoing in her 
head.  
Particularly noteworthy, and consistent with the experiences of other battered women 
who have killed, was the response of the legal system to Scott’s repeated abuse.  At the 
murder trial, Susan Christensen, the assistant county attorney for Shelby County, testified 
to her interactions with Dixie Shanahan.  In her role as assistant county attorney, 
Christensen was responsible for prosecuting misdemeanor domestic violence cases.89
Christensen also maintained a private practice, specializing in family law.90  Christensen 
told the jury that she met with Dixie Shanahan in November 1996, when Dixie came to 
her seeking advice about how to handle Scott’s violence.  Christensen advised Dixie to
87 WALKER, supra note 71, at 73.
88 BROWNE, supra note 24, at 141.
89
 Tr. at 698.
90
 Tr. at 700.  Christensen estimated that about a quarter of her family law cases involved domestic 
violence.  Id.
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petition the court for a civil protective order91 and discussed instituting criminal 
proceedings with her.  Christensen testified that while Dixie was not ready to lodge
criminal charges against Scott, she did begin to fill out the papers for a protective order.92
After that conversation, Christensen was sufficiently concerned for Dixie’s safety that she 
called the sheriff’s office and told them that if they got a call from the Shanahan home, 
“they should take it very seriously.”93 Christensen later learned that Dixie never returned 
to the clerks’ office to complete the paperwork.94  Three months later, however, Dixie 
went to court and was granted a protective order, which was in place at the time of 
Scott’s first criminal trial on June 23, 1997.95
Christensen described Dixie as “initially…cooperative” during the first criminal trial, 
which Christensen prosecuted.  On July 2, 1997, however, after Scott pled guilty and 
served two days in jail for punching Dixie, Dixie asked that the protective order be 
lifted.96  While Christensen testified that to her knowledge, no violation of the protective 
order was ever reported,97 a cursory glance at the timeline Christensen provided makes it 
clear that if Dixie Shanahan obtained a protective order three months after she first 
visited Christensen in November 1996 which was still in effect at the time of the trial, the 
events that caused Scott Shanahan to plead guilty in June 1997 were a violation of that 
first protective order.
91
 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of 
State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).
92
 Tr. at 707.  In Iowa, such orders are known as 236 orders.  Id.
93
 Tr. at 709.
94
 Tr. at 710.
95
   Tr. at 711.
96
 Dixie provided supporting documentation for the request from a clinical psychologist at Prairie Rose 
Mental Health, which suggests that Scott had, as promised, sought counseling.  Tr. at 713.  
97
 Tr. at 714.
20
Christensen again prosecuted Scott Shanahan when he was charged with domestic 
abuse assault in September 1997, just three months after his first conviction.98   Dixie did 
not assist the prosecution on that occasion; instead, she sent the court a letter stating that 
she had exaggerated the violence and asking that the charges be dismissed.99  But police 
reports reflect the seriousness of the injuries Dixie Shanahan sustained and a sheriff’s
deputy photographed those injuries.100  On that occasion, Scott Shanahan served four 
days in jail.101
Christensen was also involved with the third case against Scott Shanahan, the felony 
prosecution in October 2000.  After the incident leading to that prosecution, Dixie fled to 
Texas, giving prosecutors “some comfort knowing that there was some distance between 
the two.”102  But that comfort turned to distress when Dixie refused to return from Texas 
to testify and prosecutors were forced to drop the charges against Scott Shanahan.103
Susan Christensen testified that she believed that if Dixie Shanahan had cooperated 
with the third prosecution, the legal system would have protected her, would have 
stopped the violence.  Christensen stated, “[T]hese were choices we gave Dixie, in 
particular, that she chose not to take and those choices have been proven over and over to 
be effective if allowed to take their course.”104 But Christensen’s own testimony shows 
98
 Tr. at 714.
99
 Tr. at 715.  Recantation is a recurrent theme in criminal prosecutions involving battered women.  Police 
and prosecutors have experimented with a number of policy solutions to that problem, including victimless 
prosecution, no-drop prosecution policies and compelling the victim’s attendance.  See, e.g., Deborah 
Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victim’s Long-Term Safety in 
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. UNIV. J. GENDER, SOC. POL. & L. 465 (2003) 
(discussing various prosecution policies).
100
 Tr. at 187.  Unfortunately, the testimony of the deputy who responded, Brad McQueen, was not 
available, as he had sustained a head injury that impaired his memory.  Tr. at 185.
101
 Tr. at 716.
102
  Tr. at 717-18.
103
 Tr. at 719.
104
 Tr. at 728.  Not everyone shares Christensen’s belief in the effectiveness of these strategies.  For a 
discussion of the many ways that the legal system can fail battered women, see generally Leigh Goodmark, 
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that Scott Shanahan was not the type of batterer who was deterred by the legal system.105
Dixie got a restraining order.  Scott violated it.106  She pursued criminal charges.  Scott 
served two days in jail, was ordered to participate in batterer’s intervention counseling107, 
and nonetheless was arrested and convicted again for assaulting Dixie just three months 
later.  On that occasion, he served four days in jail.  When he was released, he began 
abusing Dixie anew.108 What was the sum total of Dixie Shanahan’s experiences with the 
legal system?  Three cases, six days in jail, one order that Scott attend counseling.  And 
the violence continued unabated, increasing in frequency and severity, after those 
interventions.  By the time of the third criminal case, Dixie Shanahan knew that the legal 
system could not or would not keep Scott Shanahan from abusing her.  It is hardly 
surprising that she chose to remain in Texas rather than returning to Iowa to cooperate 
with the third prosecution.  Like many battered women who kill, it must have been clear 
to Dixie Shanahan that the police and courts had little to offer her by way of 
protection.109
Law Is The Answer? Do We Know That for Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for 
Battered Women, 23 S.L.U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2004).
105
 Abusive men with violent criminal histories—like Scott Shanahan--are more likely to violate protective 
orders than other men.  Joan Zorza & Nancy K.D. Lemon, Two-Thirds of Civil Protection Orders Are 
Never Violated; Better Court and Community Services Increase Success Rates, in VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN: LAW, PREVENTION, PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT, TREATMENT, HEALTH 28-1(Joan Zorza, ed. 
2002).
106
 Scott Shanahan not only violated the first protective order, as Susan Christensen’s testimony shows, but 
also the no contact order that had been filed at the time of the third prosecution.  Deputy Mark Hervey 
testified that he had heard that Scott had been contacting Dixie in Texas in violation of the no contact order, 
but apparently Hervey took no action.  Tr. at 209.
107
 Tr. at 712-13.
108
 Christensen admitted on cross-examination that in her experience, about half of the women who got 
restraining orders reported further problems.  The other half either experienced no difficulties or simply did 
not report them.  Tr. at 733.  These numbers refute Christensen’s assertion that legal action can be counted 
on to prevent further abuse.  Christensen also acknowledged that many victims of violence have little faith 
in the ability of protective orders to keep them safe.  Tr. at 736.
109
 Dixie lacked access to other resources to escape the violence as well.  Because of the lack of services for 
battered women in rural Iowa, Dixie would have had to travel at least forty miles to access services.  Jeff 
Eckhoff, Most Iowa Counties Lack Havens for Women, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 1, 2004, at 1.
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By August of 2002, the abuse against Dixie Shanahan had reached new levels of both 
frequency and severity.  Scott’s threats to kill her became more frequent.  And on August 
30, 2002, Dixie was finally confronted by abuse that she could not assimilate—the
credible threat to kill her unborn child.  Scott repeatedly threatened to kill both Dixie and 
the baby, telling her that they would be dead before the day was over.  It was the certainty 
that Scott would kill her unborn child that day that finally led Dixie to strike back.110
Dixie’s actions were consistent with those of other battered women who kill not in the 
midst of a battering incident, but during a lull, having been told that the batterer will 
begin the violence again, and knowing that this time he will not stop until she and her 
unborn child are dead.
So Dixie Shanahan shot and killed Scott Shanahan, a nd the criminal justice system 
that never adequately protected her found her guilty of second degree murder and 
sentenced her to fifty years imprisonment. The conviction was certainly a legally 
permissible outcome; a jury could have found, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that Dixie 
Shanahan committed second degree murder.  But the conclusion that the verdict was 
legally sound should not be the end of the analysis, as the residents of Defiance, Iowa 
who were stunned by the sentence Dixie Shanahan received recognized.  The next section 
asks: Even if she was legally culpable for his death, was punishing Dixie Shanahan for 
shooting Scott Shanahan just?
III. Justice and the Punishment of Dixie Shanahan
110
 Before Dixie disclosed to anyone that she killed Scott, she told friends and acquaintances that he had left 
the home on her demand.  Kathryn Myers testified that Dixie had told her that she wanted Scott Shanahan 
out of her life because she was afraid for her unborn child’s life.  Tr. at 314.  When Dixie finally confessed 
to Kathryn Myers that she shot Scott, shortly before the police apprehended her, she clutched her stomach, 
as if to protect that child, named Brittany.  Tr. at 326.
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“Criminal punishment can be defined as the infliction by state authority of a 
consequence normally regarded as an evil (e.g., death or imprisonment) on an individual 
found to be legally guilty of a crime.”111 Punishments are generally unwelcome to the 
recipient; intentional and imposed for a reason; ordered by those regarded as having a 
right to do so; inflicted as a result of an infringement of law, rule or custom; imposed 
upon someone who played a voluntary part (or is viewed as having played a voluntary 
part) in the infringement; justified by the punisher; and intended to be perceived as 
punishment by the punisher.112 Punishment in the criminal system can be justified under 
a number of theories.  If, however, a punishment satisfies none of those theories, that 
punishment cannot be considered just.  This section reviews the four major theories 
underpinning criminal punishment in the United States, then asks whether punishing 
Dixie Shanahan was justified under any of those theories.
A.  Theories of Criminal Punishment
Criminal punishment is generally justified by one of four theories: retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.113  Each of these theories will be considered 
in turn, then applied to the case of Dixie Shanahan.
1. Retribution
111 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE 122 (1984).
112 NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 1-3 (1991).  H.L.A. Hart defines the elements of punishment as 
involving pain or other unpleasant consequences, for an offense against legal rules, of an actual or 
supposed offender for that offense, intentionally administered by someone other than the offender, and 
imposed by the legal system.  H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5 (1968).  Herbert Packer adds that punishment be imposed for the purpose of 
preventing offenses against legal rules or exacting retribution or both to that list.  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 31 (1968).  Critics of criminal punishment counter that there is no 
consensus about the nature or functions of punishment, that punishment can just as easily be seen as a 
means of perpetuating an unjust status quo or oppressing citizens as it can a “reaffirmation of the 
community’s ethical values” or a defense against anarchy.  AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 10 (1971).
113
 Leon Radzinowicz argues that looking for a single justification for punishment is as useless as looking 
for a single cause of crime.  LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 115 (1966).
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Retribution is the oldest moral underpinning for criminal punishment, dating back to
the Code of Hammurabi, developed by the Babylonians around the 18th century B.C.114
The lex talionis, or law of retaliation, limited all sentences to punishment proportionate to 
the crime—an eye for an eye, a life for a life.115  Retributive theory has since evolved to 
include a number of different moral justifications for criminal punishment, all resting on 
the notion that punishment is necessary to give the criminal what she deserves as a result 
of her wrongdoing.  The notions of criminals paying for their crimes, paying their debts 
to society, or getting what is coming to them all grow out of retributive theory.116  While 
modern retributive theory no longer requires “eye for an eye” punishment, it continues to 
maintain that punishment should be proportionate to the crime committed.117
“Retributive conceptions of criminal punishment rest essentially on the inherent 
propriety of punishment as a consequence for wrongdoing, that is, it amounts to an 
obligation to be settled in an accounting among the offender, the victim, and society.”118
While that obligation is at the core of retributivist theory, theorists have posited a number 
of different explanations for why that obligation exists.119  For Emmanuel Kant, for 
example, punishment was a categorical imperative; the imposition of punishment was not 
114 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15-16 (1989).
115 Id.
116 PACKER, supra note 112 , at 10.
117 HART, supra note 112, at 234.   Retributive theorists argue that retribution should not be confused with 
revenge.  Some key differences:  retribution rights a wrong, while revenge can be for something other than 
a moral wrong; retribution sets limits to the appropriate punishment, while revenge can be (and frequently 
intentionally is) disproportionate; revenge is personal, retribution does not rely on personal ties; revenge 
involves pleasure in the suffering of another, while retribution lacks this emotionalism; revenge is not 
general—the avenger is not committed to seeking it again in similar circumstances; retribution is visited 
only upon the wrongdoer, while revenge can involve innocent persons close to the person revenge is being 
sought against.  C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 42-43 
(1987).  One prominent retributive theorist now believes that the two may not be as separable as he 
previously believed, however.  JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 85 (1992).
118 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 48.
119
 For an overview of these theories, see WALKER, supra note 112, at 73-82.
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just permissible, but morally required simply because wrongdoing had occurred.120
Punishment restores the moral balance that is upset when a crime occurs.121  John Rawls 
states, “[P]unishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment.”122
Others have similarly argued that the punishment negates the wrongdoing, creating the 
sense that the wrongful act never happened.123  Building on this theory, “[p]unishment 
annuls crime in the sense that it establishes that the victim has…rights, and hence the 
criminal’s denial of them is a mistake.”124  Punishment, then, restores the rights intruded 
upon by the criminal to the extent that the punishment is commensurate to the amount of 
intrusion created by the crime.125
Another strain of retributive theory argues that “fairness dictates that a system in 
which benefits and burdens are equally distributed have a mechanism designed to prevent 
a maldistribution in the benefits and burdens….it is just to punish those who have 
violated the rules and caused the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens.”126  The 
benefits need not be material, but rather can be the voluntary renunciation of restraining 
oneself from violating the law.  Punishment deprives the offender of the ability to indulge 
his will by enjoying benefits made possible because others have assumed the burden of 
following the law, a burden the wrongdoer has renounced.127  Allowing the criminal to 
profit from his own wrongdoing is unjust not only to the victim, but to everyone who is 
120 HART, supra note 112, at 232.
121 Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT xvii (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1972).
122
 John Rawls, Rule Utilitarianism (II), in Ezorsky, supra note 121, at 84.
123 See A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in Ezorsky, id., at 7.
124 TEN, supra note 117, at 39.
125 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 113, at 10.
126
  Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in Ezorsky, supra note 121, at 117-18.
127 TEN, supra note 117, at 55.
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obedient to the law.128 Punishment can also serve as communication with the offender 
under retributive theory.  Robert Nozick describes punishment as “a communicative act 
transmitting to the wrongdoer…how wrong his conduct was.”129  Retributive punishment 
reconnects the offender with the values from which his act has alienated him.130
The idea of desert is central to retributive theory; as C.S. Lewis explained, “[T]he 
concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice.  It is only 
as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust.”131  Desert is a moral 
concept, not a legal one.  “[A] legal code cannot suffice to determine what a criminal 
deserves to suffer as a penalty.  The misery he deserves depends on the moral wrong he 
has committed.”132  John Rawls concurs, “That a criminal should be punished follows 
from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of 
the act.”133  Desert should also be individualized; as no two crimes are the same, no two 
punishments should be.134
Why is retribution preferable to other theories of punishment?  Retributivists argue 
that retribution “promises the certainty which utilitarianism cannot.  The punisher can be 
sure that whatever else he may or may not be achieving he is at least inflicting more or 
less what the offender deserves.”135  Punishment in and of itself is the end of 
retributivists; punishment need have no other benefit, either to the individual being 
128 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 78 (1979).  Murphy describes the criminal 
as a free rider in the scheme of social cooperation, enjoying the benefits of the rule of law without making 
the sacrifice of self-restraint required to sustain it.  MURPHY, supra note 117, at 23-24.
129 TEN, supra note 117, at 42.
130 Id. at 45.
131
 C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, 
EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 195 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds. 1972).
132
  Ezorsky, supra note 121, at xxii.  Others argue, however, that desert can be either a moral (desert as a 
requital of evil for evil) or legal (desert as giving back an unfair advantage) concept.  MOORE, supra note 
114, at 77.
133 Id. at 84.
134 MOORE, supra note 114, at 77.
135 WALKER, supra note 112, at 67.
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punished or to society.  As Herbert Packer explains, “[M]an is a responsible moral agent 
to whom rewards are due when he makes right moral choices and to whom punishment is 
due when he makes wrong ones….these imperatives flow from the nature of man and do 
not require—indeed do not permit—any pragmatic justification.”136  Others argue, 
however, that retributive theory debases individuals to serve a theory.  
The retributive view of punishment justifies the infliction of evil upon a living soul, 
even though it will do neither him nor any one else any good whatever….It is the 
retributive theory which shows a disrespect for human personality by proposing to 
sacrifice human life and human Well-being to a lifeless fetish styled the Moral Law, 
which apparently, though unconscious, has a sense of dignity and demands the 
immolation of victims to avenge its injured amour proper….137
2. Utilitarian Theories of Punishment
The other three primary rationales for criminal punishment are utilitarian theories.  
The utilitarian view of punishment is that punishment always creates suffering, and 
suffering is always evil; there is no justification for suffering (and therefore, punishment) 
unless some secular good flows from that suffering.  Punishment is justified only to the 
extent that it prevents or reduces the incidence of antisocial behavior.138 If punishment 
creates a greater net secular good, punishment is just (even, some would argue, if the 
person being punished is innocent); if punishment does not create a greater net good for 
society, even the guilty should go free.139  Each of these theories—deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—will be discussed below.140
a. Deterrence
136 PACKER, supra note 112, at 9.
137
 H. Rashdall, Punishment and the Individual, in Ezorsky, supra note 121, at 65.
138 PACKER, supra note 112, at 11.
139 MOORE, supra note 114, at 37.
140
 Some have argued that two of these theories—general deterrence and incapacitation—are merely 
rationalizations for retribution, however.  AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 58.  
Packer suggests that it is possible that all justifications are in truth fueled by vengeance.  PACKER, supra
note 112, at 59-60.
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Deterrence can be defined as refraining from an action because of the perceived 
negative possible consequences of the action.141 Deterrence theorists argue that 
punishment is justified to the extent that it prevents future crime.  While punishment may 
be an evil, good accrues through the prevention or reduction of the greater evil of 
crime.142 Deterrence “justifies penal coercion on the assumption that it contributes to 
order and stability in society by enforcing compliance with norms embodied in criminal 
law.”143  In the short term, order is maintained by maximizing the effectiveness of 
punishment for potential criminals; in the long term, punishment molds the behavior of,
and reinforces morality for, future generations.144  Crime is prevented by the threat of 
unpleasant consequences; the threat is reinforced by the punishment of those who commit 
crimes.145  Those consequences need not necessarily be physical; the threat of shame or 
social disgrace as a result of punishment may be sufficient to coerce compliance with the 
law.146
Jeremy Bentham explains that punishment, for deterrence theorists, has four objects: 
to prevent all offenses; to prevent the worst offenses, if offending is inevitable; to limit 
the offender to as little harm as possible; and to prevent that harm as cheaply as 
possible.147  Bentham’s model 
assumes a perfectly hedonistic, perfectly rational actor whose object it is to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain.  To such an actor contemplating the possibility of a 
criminal act the decision is based on a calculus: How much do I stand to gain by 
doing it?  How much do I stand to lose if I am caught doing it? What are the chances 
of my getting away with it?  What is the balance of gain and loss as discounted by the 
chance of apprehension?  The purpose of criminal punishment, in this model, is to 
141 WALKER, supra note 112, at 13.
142 PACKER, supra note 112, at 39.
143 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 49.
144 Id. at 49, 58.
145 Id. at 49.
146 PACKER, supra note 112, at 42-43.
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inject into the calculus a sufficient prospect of loss or pain to reduce to zero the 
attractiveness of the possible gain.148
Deterrence theory can be divided into two strains: special and general.  Special 
deterrence theory argues that punishment is intended to prevent a person who has already 
been punished from committing similar offenses in the future.149  “Once subjected to the 
pain of punishment…the individual is conditioned to avoid in the future conduct that he 
knows is likely to result again in the infliction of pain through punishment.”150  General 
deterrence, in contrast, “is not concerned with the effects of punishment upon the 
subsequent career of someone who has been punished.  It concentrates instead upon the 
efficacy of the threat of punishment upon those who are disposed to or tempted by 
crime.”151  Punishment deters would-be offenders by showing them, through the 
examples of others who have been punished, what they can expect to experience if they 
choose to do wrong.152
Punishment only acts as a deterrent when consistently applied, however.153  “A penal 
system that hopes to deter crime cannot tolerate exceptions.”  If no punishment is meted 
out, “the deterrent effect of punishment breaks down, and subsequent punishments are 
wasted, as they inflict pain for no compensating return—a cruelty that cannot be 
justified.”154   Accordingly, “a legal system should not make exceptions to rules.  Thus, 
148 PACKER, supra note 112, at 40-41.
149 TEN, supra note 117, at 7
150 PACKER, supra note 112, at 45.
151 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 55.
152 TEN, supra note 117, at 7.
153 See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 113, at 122 (arguing that general deterrence is unlikely if laws are not 
adequately enforced).
154 MOORE, supra note 114, at 38.
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the rules themselves should be humane, but the enforcement of those rules must be 
absolute.”155
At least one prominent retributivist scholar has come to believe that deterrence may 
provide a stronger justification for punishment than retribution.  If moral theory is 
understood in the political context of the state, the state’s goals for punishment should be 
paramount.  And in the area of punishment, the state’s overriding concern is with 
preventing future crime, not in addressing crime that has already occurred.  Given that 
context, deterrence is arguably a more appropriate justification for punishment than 
retribution.156  Scholars have questioned whether as a practical matter, however, 
punishment actually serves this deterrent function.157
b. Incapacitation
“In a society that was single-mindedly devoted to the repression of crime as a 
paramount objective of social life, incapacitation would be the most immediately 
plausible utilitarian justification for the punishment of offenders.”158  Under this theory, 
punishment is justified because the incarceration of the offender prevents that person 
from committing further acts of harm, thus increasing the good to society.  “To the hard-
headed man in the street the utilitarian justification seems obvious.  The longer a 
murderer, rapist, child-molester or armed robber is detained the fewer the people he will 
victimize in the future: hopefully none.”159  That the criminal may not be either deterred 
or rehabilitated is immaterial to those justifying punishment on incapacitation; the 
155 Id. at 39.
156 MURPHY, supra note 117, at 24.
157 TEN, supra note 117, at 8 (arguing that there is no evidence that punishment deters individuals); see 
generally Johannes Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L. Q. 76 (1968).
158 PACKER, supra note 112, at 48.
159 WALKER, supra note 112, at 38.
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benefits stem solely from the offender’s inability to re-offend while “out of general social 
circulation.”160  Incapacitation justifications rest on predictions that those who have 
committed crimes in the past are likely to commit additional crimes (of the same or 
different kinds) in the future.  The fact that a person has committed a crime serves as a 
basis for assessing that person’s personality and forecasting the strong likelihood that the 
person will re-offend in some way.161
c. Rehabilitation
“The most immediately appealing justification for punishment is the claim that it may 
be used to prevent crime by so changing the personality of the offender that he will 
conform to the dictates of law.”162  In the first half of the twentieth century, philosophers 
and reformers turned away from the idea of punishment as payback and looked to the 
behavioral sciences to remake offenders “into law abiding citizens.”163  Rehabilitation 
inures to the benefit of both the criminal—“in order to afford the means of amendment 
and to lead the transgressor to repentance, and to mercy”164—and to society.  
Rehabilitation treats each offender as an individual whose special needs and problems 
must be understood in order to effectuate positive change in that individual and must 
begin with an assessment of the offender’s amenability to treatment.165  Rehabilitation 
can include inducement of repentance, recognition of moral guilt, and development of 
awareness of the demands of society via vocational training and psychological 
160 TEN, supra note 115, at 8.  While Ten acknowledges that there are opportunities to commit crimes while 
in prison, he contends that those opportunities are “generally reduced.”  Id.
161 PACKER, supra note 112, at 49.
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163 MOORE, supra note 114, at 57.
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treatment.166  The intensity and duration of punishment depends upon the amount of 
effort needed to change the offender’s personality.167  The offender is deemed 
rehabilitated when his values have changed sufficiently that he will not commit similar 
offenses in the future because he believes such offenses to be wrong.168
Some proponents of rehabilitation measured the reformation of female offenders 
differently than that of men.  William I .Thomas believed that criminal behavior in 
women was linked to their desire to experience the same kind of excitement as men. 
These “women who were unadjusted…that is, women who wished for ‘freedom in the 
larger world’—were to be detained for indeterminate periods and psychologically 
adjusted to their original ‘interest in human babies.’”169
Rehabilitation was touted as a superior approach to criminal justice, improving the 
individual offender rather than inflicting the pain of punishment.  “[W]hat could be more 
humane, more civilized, more sensible and more benevolent than directing society’s 
efforts solely toward the end of achieving rehabilitation or cure of that social misfit who 
breaks the law?”170  Rehabilitation offered a number of benefits: saving the offender, 
protecting society by imprisoning the offender until the offender reformed, and 
“reduc[ing] the crime rate not only be using cure-or-detention to eliminate recidivism, but 
hopefully also by the identification of potential criminals in advance so that they can be 
rendered harmless by preventive treatment.”171  Proponents of rehabilitation stressed that 
166 HART, supra note 112, at 26.
167 PACKER, supra note 112, at 54.
168 TEN, supra note 117, at 7-8.
169 JONES, supra note 72, at 7.
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they were not excusing the offender’s behavior, but directing society’s resources in the 
manner most likely to result in the prevention of further criminal activity.172
Rehabilitation has its critics as well.  Although proponents ask “how the reformatory 
view of punishment can be accused of disrespect for human personality,”173 critics argue 
that there is a legitimate moral question about whether society has a right to 
fundamentally change an offender’s personality in order to compel him to become good, 
as well as a practical question about whether we know how to achieve that result.174
Rehabilitation, however well intended, still views the individual as subordinate to society 
to the extent that the individual does not produce good for society.  As Herbert Packer 
notes,
However benevolent the purpose of reform, however better off we expect its object to 
be, there is no blinking the fact that what we do to the offender in the name of reform 
is being done to him by compulsion, and for our sake, not for his.  Rehabilitation may 
be the most humane goal of punishment, but it is a goal of punishment so long as its 
invocation depends upon finding that an offense has been committed, and so long as 
its object is to prevent the commission of offenses.175
Others argue that rehabilitation undermines the general deterrent effect of 
punishment, subordinating the prevention of a first offense to the prevention of a future 
one by the same actor.176  Rehabilitation is also particularly susceptible to misuse.  
Because the length of sentence is tied directly to the time needed to reform the offender, 
individuals who were not declared “cured” languished for years in prisons, serving terms 
far exceeding what society now deems appropriate for those crimes.177  Jeffrie G. Murphy 
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and Jules L. Coleman argue that rehabilitation no longer has any credence as a 
justification for punishment.  They contend that a therapeutic regime can in fact be more 
harmful to the individual than imprisonment and can deny the individual due process.  
Additionally, they argue that psychiatrists are no more able than others to determine an 
individual’s future dangerousness.  Finally, they believe that treating a criminal as sick 
denies both the moral seriousness of the person’s crimes as well as the personhood of the 
criminal.178
B. Applying Theories of Punishment in State v. Shanahan
Criminal punishment generally is justified under one or more of the four theories of 
punishment discussed above.  But what happens when those theories are applied to an 
individual case—for instance, the case of Dixie Shanahan?
1. Retribution
The retributivist argument for punishing Dixie Shanahan might take the following 
forms:
1. Criminal punishment is Dixie Shanahan’s just desert for killing her husband.
2. Punishing Dixie Shanahan equalizes the moral balance upset by her actions.
3. Punishing Dixie Shanahan removes the unfair advantage she obtained by killing 
her husband.
First, consider the notion of just deserts in the context of this case.  Historically, the 
idea of just desert was tied to the belief that the punishment should in some sense be 
proportionate to the crime; the lex talionis measure of an eye for an eye.179  Jeffrie 
Murphy asks, “[W]hat does it mean to say that a person deserves a certain level of 
178 MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 111, at 137-38.
179 See text accompanying note 115 supra. 
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suffering as punishment?”180 For battered women who kill, what does it mean to deserve 
punishment when the victim of the ultimate crime has inflicted immeasurable damage on 
the person who finally kills him?  Although Scott Shanahan never quite managed to kill 
Dixie, he certainly inflicted a great deal of injury, pain, anguish, and humiliation on her 
until just before the moment that he died.  Shouldn’t the suffering that Dixie Shanahan 
had already endured for nineteen years be factored into the calculus of just deserts?  
Imagine a ledger in which Scott Shanahan’s many crimes against his wife were tallied.  
Looking at all of the offenses for which Scott Shanahan was never punished (outside of 
six days in jail, which only led him to redouble his attacks on his wife), Dixie Shanahan’s 
actions may have simply brought them to even on that balance sheet.  For Dixie 
Shanahan’s deserts to be just, her punishment should have been proportionate to her
crime--the murder of an extremely abusive husband after a horrific episode of battering--
not to the generic crime of second degree murder.  A just punishment would have taken 
into account the years of abuse she endured, the immediate abuse she faced over those 
two days in August, the danger posed to her and her unborn child, her subjective belief 
that she would be killed before the end of that day.  Because her punishment was 
divorced from the context in which her actions took place, she did not receive her just 
deserts.
Linked to the idea of just deserts is the belief that punishment equalizes the moral 
balance disturbed by the commission of a crime.  Should an action still be punishable, 
though, when that action in some way restores the moral balance between the parties?  
Scott Shanahan’s continual abuse of his wife surely placed in moral debt to her.  Scott 
Shanahan never repaid that moral debt; the six days that he spent in jail over a nineteen 
180 MURPHY, supra note 117, at 22.
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year reign of terror hardly equalized the moral balance.  Rather than upsetting the moral 
balance, Dixie Shanahan’s act arguably restored some of the dignity and agency stolen 
from her for years by her husband, allowing her to escape from what promised to be 
many more years of abuse had he not killed her sooner.  
Moralistic retributivists believe that people deserve punishment when, by their 
crimes, they show themselves to be morally reprehensible; simply put, “It is good when 
bad things happen to bad people.”181  Even accepting the prosecution’s version of events, 
in which Dixie Shanahan shot her husband while he lay in bed during a lull in two days 
of abusing her, it is difficult to see how her crime renders her morally reprehensible.  By 
all accounts, Dixie Shanahan was not a bad person, a morally reprehensible person.  
Witness after witness for both the prosecution and defense described her as a good 
mother, a person who cared for others both professionally and personally, and who 
endured year after year of horrific abuse in part because of her love for the mother of her 
abuser and in part because she continued to hope that Scott Shanahan could be a good 
husband and father.  She had never been in trouble previously.  She finally acted to save 
her own life and that of her unborn child.182 When a person is not wicked—for example, 
acting under duress—that person is not deserving of punishment.183 Dixie Shanahan’s 
actions were unlawful, but she acted out of desperation, not wickedness.  From a 
moralistic retributivist perspective, Dixie Shanahan did not deserve to be punished.  
181 MOORE, supra note 114, at 94, 108-09.
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Did Dixie Shanahan derive some unfair advantage from her crime?  Was she able to 
enjoy some greater liberty than others as a result of killing her husband?  If so, legalistic 
retributivists would argue, punishing her is just.  So what did Dixie Shanahan actually get 
as a result of her crime?  Freedom from abuse.  The ability to carry her unborn child to 
term.  Safety for herself and her children.  All of the benefits that Dixie Shanahan derived 
from her crime are taken for granted by most individuals in a free society.  Legalistic 
retributivists believe that if a crime allows the actor to enjoy a wider liberty than others, 
punishment is justified to rectify that unearned advantage.184  But what if the crime 
simply restores the actor to the same state of liberty that others in the community enjoy?
Scott Shanahan had deprived his wife of rights that most people probably never have to 
consciously consider—the right to dignity, the right to bodily integrity, the right to be 
free from violence.185  Killing him gave her no benefit not enjoyed by her neighbors.  
Dixie Shanahan killed to restore herself to the state in which members of her community 
routinely lived, free from fear and abuse.  Achieving such parity can hardly be called an 
unfair advantage.
2. Utilitarian Justifications
Utilitarians would argue that Dixie Shanahan’s punishment was just if punishing her 
creates a greater societal good than refraining from punishment.  Viewed through the 
specific lenses of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, it is hard to see how 
punishing Dixie Shanahan serves the greater good.
184 Id. at 102.
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Justifying Dixie Shanahan’s punishment using deterrence theories raises two 
questions.  Will the punishment prevent her from killing again?  Will the punishment 
prevent others like her from killing?  Because the answer to both of those questions is no, 
the punishment cannot be just.
1. Special Deterrence
One function of punishment, according to deterrence theorists, is to prevent the 
individual being punished from re-offending by showing that person that their wrongful 
actions will result in some form of deprivation.  But if the offender is particularly 
unlikely either to recidivate or to be deterred because of the situation in which she finds 
herself, special deterrence is a weak justification for punishment.
Some believe that battered women are recidivists—that is, they tend to move from 
abusive relationship to abusive relationship.  If this were true, a greater likelihood would 
exist that a battered woman who had killed her abuser would find herself in a position 
where she might kill again and punishment that deterred her from engaging in that 
behavior might be justified.  But there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that 
battered women engage in serial abusive relationships186, and there is no evidence that 
battered women who kill are likely to kill again.187  Most battered women who kill, like 
Dixie Shanahan, have never been in trouble before.  As Jean Harris noted, “It is one of 
the many ironies of this prison that many of the women with the longest terms are the 
least dangerous, and led the most useful lives before coming here….They were good 
daughters, good wives, good mothers and good citizens until the day or night the final 
186 WALKER, supra note 71, at 7.
187 See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
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straw of cruelty was piled on top of all the other straws….”188 Because battered women 
who kill are unlikely to be inclined or in a position to kill again, deterrence does not 
justify their punishment.
Legal philosophers have explored whether there are situations in which 
individuals will not be deterred by the threat of punishment.  Nigel Walker contends that 
fear can make “normally law-abiding men and women become temporarily undeterrable 
and do things whose consequences would usually deter them.”189  Walker further argues 
that homicides are usually committed in undeterrable states of mind.190  Herbert Packer 
adds that “[d]eterrence does not threaten those whose lot in life is already miserable 
beyond the point of hope.”191  Dixie Shanahan’s actions are consistent with these 
arguments.  In her testimony, she described the fear that she felt for both herself and her 
unborn child, fear springing from the absolute certainty that she and the fetus would be 
dead by the end of the day, as her husband promised.192  She also described the relentless 
abuse, injury and humiliation she suffered, an existence that would surely create the kind 
of hopelessness contemplated by Packer.  
Before killing her husband, Dixie Shanahan was not thinking about the 
punishment she might endure for killing her husband; she was thinking about the 
punishment he would surely mete out if she took no action.  Only afterwards did Dixie 
Shanahan realize that she was going to go to jail “[b]ecause I had just shot somebody.”193
188 JEAN HARRIS, THEY ALWAYS CALL US LADIES 219 (1990).
189 WALKER, supra note 112, at 14.  Battered women kill out of fear rather than anger, although most 
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Consider again the four questions Bentham posited that individuals ask when they
consider committing a crime:  “How much do I stand to gain by doing it?  How much do 
I stand to lose if I am caught doing it?  What are my chances of getting away with it?  
What is the balance of gain and loss as discounted by the chance of apprehension?”194
Bentham believed that punishment operates to “reduce the attractiveness of the possible 
gain” by “inject[ing] into the calculus a sufficient prospect of loss or pain.”195  This 
model assumes an offender with the time, clarity of mind, and access to other options to 
make such a calculation.  Dixie Shanahan never considered these questions, because the 
immediacy and dangerousness of her situation did not permit her to do so.196  The threat 
of punishment did not deter her from shooting Scott Shanahan and would not, in the 
extremely unlikely event that she found herself facing a similar situation, deter her in the 
future.
2. General Deterrence
“Open a loophole for one woman to kill an abusive spouse and pretty soon you’ve got 
dozens of dead husbands.”197 This statement, made by an Iowa newspaper columnist 
shortly after Dixie Shanahan’s sentencing, captures the general deterrence rationale for 
punishing battered women who kill.  The theory of general deterrence is grounded in the 
194 See text accompanying note 148, supra.
195 PACKER, supra note 112, at 40-41.
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assumption that potential offenders are deterred from committing crimes by their 
awareness of the punishment that others have received for committing the same 
offenses.198 Jurors relied on that rationale to convict Elaine Mullis, a battered woman 
who killed her husband with a four inch paring knife as he choked and mauled her while 
she prepared dinner.199  After the trial, one juror explained the verdict: “We couldn’t just 
let her go…It would have been open season on husbands in Atkinson County.”200  Elaine 
Mullins was sentenced to life in prison.201
The idea that all women—not just battered women—will begin indiscriminately 
killing their husbands if battered women who kill are not punished drives the justification 
for punishing women like Dixie Shanahan.  But just as it is doubtful that Dixie Shanahan 
would have been deterred from her crime, it is also doubtful that other women in the 
same position would be deterred by knowing that she was punished.  Deterrent effects 
have been linked to a number of variables, including the type of crime, the incentive to 
commit the crime, the severity of the threatened punishment, the extent to which the 
198
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penalty is known to the offender, and the likelihood of being caught and punished.202
Legal philosophers believe that some crimes cannot be deterred, regardless of the severity 
of the penalty.203
Deterrence assumes that that the potential offender has options other than committing 
the crime and can therefore make a reasoned choice not to offend.  But the context in 
which battered women make decisions about offending is often one in which no other 
options are available.  For battered women who kill, the incentive is often to save their
own lives or the lives of their children, and though they may be aware of the penalties, 
they often believe that no other option is available to them, particularly because most kill 
after “numerous other efforts to fight back, escape, or appease the abuser [have] 
failed.”204  Battered women are frequently isolated from both formal and informal 
sources of help—the legal system, shelters, clergy, family, and friends.205  Even if the 
woman is able to reach out, services may be inaccessible for any number of reasons, 
including location, language, or culture.  And although services that purport to stop the 
violence may be available, they might not be particularly effective.  Battered women who 
ultimately kill are aware of the stories of women who have done everything “right”—
called the police, gotten protective orders, cooperated with prosecutors—only to be 
horribly abused or killed by their attackers.206 Which is likely to have a greater effect—
seeing battered women who kill go to prison, or seeing women who have done all the 
202 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 56.
203 Id.  at 58.  This argument assumes, of course, that deterrence works to prevent some crimes, a claim 
which has been hotly disputed in the literature.  See note 157, supra.
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system asked of them harmed, even killed, despite their best attempts to flee?207 The lack 
of meaningful alternatives for battered women whose situations have grown so dire that 
they believe they must kill or be killed impairs their ability to be deterred.
Deterrence is also grounded in the idea that the potential offender will assess her own 
position relative to the experiences of others like her.  But the experience of being 
battered is not necessarily generalizable.  In the midst of a battering incident, the victim is 
thinking only about the unique circumstances of her situation, assessing the lethality of 
her attacker and the likelihood that she or someone close to her will be killed.  It is 
unlikely that battered women assimilating their perceptions of imminent death stop to 
think, “Dixie Shanahan killed her husband and was sentenced to fifty years 
imprisonment.  My situation is like hers.  I am likely to be sentenced similarly.  
Therefore, I should find another solution—before he kills me.”  Arguably, the deterrent 
effect could operate at an earlier moment in the relationship, spurring the woman to leave 
or seek other assistance with her abuser.  That argument assumes that the decision to kill 
is made at that earlier point; studies of battered women who kill suggest, however, that 
these decisions are situational, made in the midst of a battering incident.  Thinking about 
how she won’t be there to raise her children won’t deter the battered woman who kills if 
she is certain that she or that child is about to die.
Killing her abuser is the battered woman’s only recourse in an untenable situation.  
She believes she must kill or be killed.  Knowing that Dixie Shanahan has been punished 
207
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will not deter her from saving her own life.208  General deterrence is not an adequate 
rationale for punishing Dixie Shanahan.
b. Incapacitation
Punishing Dixie Shanahan certainly means that she will be kept out of society.  The 
relevant question is whether keeping her out of society either protects society or promotes 
societal good, as required by utilitarianism.
Justifying punishment through incapacitation assumes that because an individual has 
offended in the past, she is likely to commit additional crimes; the community, therefore, 
will be safer if the individual is removed from society.209  If the offender is unlikely to 
recidivate, however, the justification fails.  Murderers have very low rates of 
recidivism210, and, as discussed above, battered women who kill have rarely engaged in 
criminal actively previously and are very unlikely to commit future crimes.211  While 
incapacitating Dixie Shanahan will certainly keep her out of society, it is doubtful that 
doing so prevents future crime.
A more interesting question is whether the greater good accrues to society as a result 
of punishing Dixie Shanahan.  By all accounts, Ms. Shanahan was a productive member 
of her community.  She provided care not only for her three children and for her 
husband’s parents until their deaths, but also for the sick and elderly patients residing in 
the nursing homes where she worked throughout her marriage.212  Proponents of 
208
 Of course, to the extent that she is proven correct when she is killed, it is impossible to know whether a 
dead battered woman was deterred by the thought of punishment.
209 PACKER, supra note 112, at 49.
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incapacitation would argue that society benefits because Ms. Shanahan is not free to 
commit other crimes.  But the likelihood of Ms. Shanahan’s re-offending is low and must 
be balanced against a number of other costs to society created by incapacitating her.  
Instead of having Ms. Shanahan contribute to the community’s tax base, the state will 
bear the costs of her incarceration for at least the next thirty-five years.  Ms. Shanahan’s 
children lose their mother, the only stable figure in their lives.  Experts believe that 
severing the bonds between children exposed to domestic violence and their abused 
parents can have profoundly negative consequences for those children.213   Ms. 
Shanahan’s new husband, friends, neighbors, co-workers and community are all deprived 
of the positive contributions she made to their lives on a daily basis.  Ms. Shanahan’s 
elderly and disabled patients no longer receive the high quality of care she provided
them.  Juxtaposing all of these losses to the community against the low risk of further 
criminal behavior, it is hard to see the utilitarian justification for incapacitation in this 
case.
c.  Rehabilitation
Will punishment rehabilitate Dixie Shanahan?  That question assumes that Ms. 
Shanahan is somehow in need of rehabilitation, an assumption based on the notion of 
criminals as diseased rather than depraved.  While the rehabilitation justification for 
punishment has fallen out of vogue in recent years, legal doctrines developed specifically 
to protect battered women could, in fact, inadvertently provide support for the idea that 
battered women need rehabilitation.
213 Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198-200 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reviewing the testimony of a 
number of experts on the impact of domestic violence on children, including Dr. Evan Stark, Dr. David 
Pelcovitz, Dr. Peter Wolf, and Betsy McAllister-Groves).
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Recognizing that the failure of courts to admit evidence of battering prevented them
from presenting persuasive self-defense cases, advocates for battered women fought to 
have this evidence admitted in the trials of battered women who killed.  Experts were
permitted to testify to the effects of battering on women and how that battering created 
the context for the actions taken by battered women who killed.  This evidence on the 
effects of domestic violence has come to be known as “battered woman syndrome.” As 
Elizabeth Schneider notes, “Because the term is frequently used as shorthand for 
‘evidence of a battering relationship’ by judges, legislators, and legal scholars, it is not 
clear in any particular context what it refers to.”214  What it suggests, however, is that all 
battered women suffer from some disease or syndrome which can be cured.  Schneider 
argues, “[B]ecause ‘battered woman syndrome’ sounds like a form of mental disease or 
defect, lawyers relying on this framework are more likely to view the case through the 
lens of an impaired mental state.”215 The term “implies that [the battered woman] is 
limited because of her weakness and her problems.”216 Judges and juries hearing such 
evidence may make similar assumptions, triggering the rehabilitation justification for 
punishment: punishment is appropriate in these cases because the battered woman suffers 
from a condition that must be cured before she can safely resume her place in society.
The problem with this rationale, of course, is that the term “battered woman 
syndrome” has been horribly misconstrued.  While some battered women are mentally 
214 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 123 ( 2000).
215 Id. at 124.
216 Id. at 135.  Battered woman syndrome has also been criticized for inappropriately reinforcing 
stereotypes of battered women as passive victims.  This characterization is particularly problematic for 
battered women who kill because “it fails to account for why they eventually acted.  Jurors are presented 
with a description of the battered woman who is helpless and submissive.  Any woman who deviates from 
the model, who seeks help or defends her own life may be seen as abnormal or unreasonable.”  BUSCH, 
supra note 73, at 40.
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ill,217 the condition of being battered does not, in and of itself, constitute a mental illness 
or defect.218  A battered woman who kills cannot be cured of being a battered woman 
through punishment—nor does she need to be.
Rehabilitation also assumes that the criminal cannot or does not recognize the 
wrongfulness of her actions.  But most battered women who kill regret the killings and 
recognize their own legal guilt.  They do ask, however, that these killings be considered 
in the context of the violence that they suffered.219  As one woman explained, 
I’m not asking to be found not guilty, because I am guilty, I took his life, I did it.  
But, there were extenuating circumstances, and they should take that into 
consideration, you know….I am definitely guilty of taking his life, I mean, if I 
was found not guilty, they’d have to look for who did it, right, I mean, someone’s 
got to be guilty.  And I certainly take responsibility for what I did, I have no 
problem with that, but I certainly don’t deserve 18 to 20 years for it.220
C.L. Ten explains that offenders are rehabilitated to the extent that they will not commit 
similar offenses in the future because their values have changed and they now believe 
such offenses to be wrong.  Most battered women who kill already have this 
understanding, but if faced with the same situation would likely make the same decision, 
believing that they had no other choice.  As Dixie Shanahan explained shortly after her 
sentencing, “If I was in the same circumstances, would I do it again?  Yes I 
would…knowing what it cost me and my children.”221  These women need no change in 
values—only a change in the circumstances that created a situation that led them to kill.
Neither retributive nor utilitarian theories of justice justify the punishment Dixie 
Shanahan received for killing her husband.  The utilitarian theories, as discussed above, 
217 See generally CAROLE WARSHAW & HOLLY BARNES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MENTAL HEALTH & 
TRAUMA: RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS, available online at 
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/otherpubs/Mental Health Research.pdf.
218
 Kinports, supra note 2, at 170.
219 BUSCH, supra note 73, at 66.
220 Id.
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 Staci Hupp, Shanahan says she would do it again, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 13, 2004, at x.
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cannot be justly applied to the case of Dixie Shanahan, or indeed, to the cases of most 
battered women who kill.  Punishment could be justified under a retributivist theory, but 
only to the extent that Dixie Shanahan received her just deserts.  Because the punishment 
was not imposed with an eye toward the abuse she had suffered or the context for her 
actions, there was no justice in the punishment of Dixie Shanahan.
What precludes Dixie Shanahan and other battered women who kill from receiving 
their just deserts?  Three factors spur the unjust sentences in these cases:  mandatory 
minimum sentence requirements, judicial unwillingness to consider context, and concerns 
about the failure to punish these women harshly. 
IV. Justice Denied: Why Battered Women Receive Unjust Punishments
A.  Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Conceding that Dixie Shanahan was guilty of second degree murder, retributivist 
theories justify some kind of punishment.  But her sentence—50 years to life, with a 
minimum term of imprisonment of 35 years—was not justified.  This inequity is a result 
of the mandatory minimum sentence Judge Smith was required to impose in her case.  
Mandatory minimum sentences preclude judges from ordering appropriate punishment 
when punishment is due.  The inability to exercise discretion in sentencing defeated the 
just application of the theories of criminal punishment in the case of Dixie Shanahan.
1.     Mandatory Minimums in Iowa
The mandatory minimum sentence in Iowa for second degree murder is fifty years
imprisonment.222  An offender must serve at least 70% of her sentence before becoming 
222 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.3 & 907.11 (West 2003).
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eligible for parole.223  Mandatory minimum sentences in Iowa have been upheld against
constitutional challenges that the sentences constitute violations of equal protection or 
cruel and unusual punishment.224
2.     Women and Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimum sentences remove judicial discretion from sentencing 
determinations, ensuring that every person convicted of a particular crime serves the 
same amount of time for the offense.225 One goal of these sentencing reforms was to 
create gender equality in sentencing.226 For women, however, the move to mandatory 
minimum sentences has been particularly problematic, for judges are no longer able to 
consider the contexts in which these women’s crimes take place.  In cases involving drug 
crimes, that has meant that women who were marginally involved in the drug trade 
because of their relationships with high level drug dealers have been sentenced to long 
prison terms—in some cases, terms longer than those received by their much more 
culpable mates.227  Courts have been unable to weigh the nature of the woman’s 
involvement, factors mitigating her responsibility (for example, physical abuse by the 
223 IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.12 (West 2003).  Until 2003, Iowa law required an offender to serve 85% of her 
sentence prior to becoming eligible for parole.  In Dixie Shanahan’s case, that means a 7 year difference in 
the length of her sentence.  The old Iowa law was strongly influenced by requirements placed on funding 
available to the states through the federal Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth in Sentencing Act.  IOWA 
LEGISLATIVE SERVICES AGENCY FISCAL SERVICES, REVIEW OF IOWA’S 85.0% SENTENCING LAW 1 (2003).  
Once that funding was eliminated, Iowa no longer had a “financial incentive to maintain the 85.0% 
sentencing law….”  Id. at 2.
224
 State v. Holmes, 276 N.W. 2d 823, 829 (Iowa 1979).
225
 Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851 (1995).  Mandatory minimum sentences were seen by some as a 
means of addressing gender and race inequity in sentencing.  Id. at 1852-53; see also Shimica Gaskins, 
“Women of Circumstance”—The Effects of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally 
Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1533, 1539 (2004).
226 Myrna S. Raeder, The Forgotten Offender: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory 
minimums on Women and Their Children, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 157 (1995).  This desire to enforce gender 
parity in sentencing is arguably a backlash against feminism.  “As law enforcement officials repeatedly told 
criminologist Rita Simon: ‘If it’s equality these women want, we’ll see that they get it.’”  JONES, supra note 
72, at 4.
227 See generally Gaskins, supra note 225.
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dealer coercing the woman’s involvement), or the woman’s status as a mother or 
caregiver.228
Battered women who kill face an analogous problem.  Confronted with mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws, battered women who choose to take their chances at trial
know that if convicted, judges will be unable to factor the abuse that they have suffered—
both over time and immediately before the crime--into sentencing determinations.229
Judges are not able to consider the children and families left behind when these mothers 
are incarcerated for long prison terms.  They are not permitted to factor in the previously 
spotless criminal records of the offenders and the contributions those women made to 
their communities.230 And, as described above, much of this information is important in 
determining the justice of a sentence under the prevailing theories of punishment.  
Retributive goals are not met if the sentence meted out gives an offender far more time 
than she deserves, given the context in which she acted.  Judges cannot weigh the good to 
society a particular sentence would create if the judge has no options in sentencing.  
Without some discretion, judges are unable to do justice.
3.     Mandatory Minimums and State v. Shanahan
228 Id..
229
 The ability to consider that information can make a tremendous difference.  For example, when Laura 
Rogers pled guilty to manslaughter after killing her husband, who had battered her and videotaped his rape 
and impregnation of her daughter, Judge Paul A. Hackner factored expert testimony about battered spouse 
syndrome into his decision to sentence her to ten years in prison but to suspend all but the time she had 
served.  Rogers was released from prison that day.  Eric Rich, Arundel Judge Frees Woman in Death of 
‘Horrible’ Man, WASHINGTON POST, November 10, 2004, at B1.
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  As the Honorable J. Spencer Letts explained, “Indeed, under this sledgehammer approach, it could 
make no difference if the day before making this one slip in an otherwise unblemished life the defendant 
had rescued 15 children from a burning building or had won the Congressional Medal of Honor while 
defending his country.”  Id. at 1543 (quoting Families Against Mandatory Minimums, FAMM Primer on 
Mandatory Sentences 5 (1998)).
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This is precisely what happened in State v. Shanahan.  Dixie Shanahan turned down a 
plea bargain that could have resulted in her release in as little as four years.231 Instead, 
she chose to tell her story to the jury; the jury rejected her self-defense claim, believing 
that her husband had been asleep, and therefore not an imminent threat to her, when she 
shot him.232  Because under Iowa law they could not be told the penalties for the various 
crimes they were considering, some members of the jury believed that the second degree 
murder verdict would result in a sentence of twenty-five years, and that Shanahan would 
be released in eight.233  At least one juror believed that the abuse Dixie Shanahan suffered 
should have been factored into her sentence.234
But that choice was not available to Judge Smith.  As he told Dixie Shanahan at her 
sentencing, “[T]his Court has no option but to sentence you to prison for the 
indeterminate term of not to exceed 50 years.”  Smith continued,
[I]t needs to be said that the mandatory minimum sentencing structure that has been 
imposed on this court throughout the State of Iowa for this type of offense is, in my 
opinion, wrong.  It may be legal but it is wrong….By imposing mandatory minimums 
as severe as this one in this case, a legislature from 15 years ago is, in effect, 
sentencing you, knowing nothing about this case, without trusting the good judgment 
of the judge in the case and without trusting the good judgment of the Board of Parole 
that might consider your case sooner than they will….Perhaps, Dixie, your case will 
make the legislature, which is made up of good people dedicated to public service, 
take notice and do something to untie the hands of the judges in this state and the 
Parole Board in this state.  I hope so and I know your friends and you do as well.  
However, at this time, as your attorney has said, I have no other options….The reason 
for this sentence is the term of the statute—I’m sorry.235
Judge Smith knew that justice had not been done in this case.  So did many in the 
community that was ostensibly being kept safe by incarcerating Dixie Shanahan.  One 
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woman shared her story in a letter to the editor of the Des Moines Register: “I am 
appalled she was convicted and sentenced so harshly.  If you have not been in her 
position, you cannot know the feeling of helplessness that would drive you to protect 
yourself and your children by such desperate means.  Twenty-four years ago I, too, held a 
gun to the head of my abuser as he slept.  The only reason I did not pull that trigger is 
because my infant daughter woke up and cried.”236  As Rekha Basu of the Des Moines 
Register concluded about the Shanahan case, “There are cases where the law is followed 
to the letter, but you’d be hard-pressed to conclude that justice was served.”237
Shanahan’s friends and attorney have asked Iowa’s governor for a pardon.  Three 
jurors signed a letter to the governor on her behalf, stating, “We would wholeheartedly 
support a decision on your part to reduce Dixie Shanahan’s sentence.”238 Even if 
Shanahan is pardoned—an outcome which most believe is unlikely at best239—a pardon 
fails to address the underlying problem faced by Dixie Shanahan and other battered 
women who kill.  Dixie Shanahan did not receive a just sentence because Judge Smith 
was unable to sentence her as an individual--as a mother, as a member of the community, 
as a battered woman who had endured nineteen years of horrific abuse.  The Des Moines 
Register opined, “In an ideal world, the judge would have established a sentence based on 
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a detailed assessment of the facts of Shanahan’s case, her record and potential for future 
criminal trouble based on expert testimony.”  Instead, because of mandatory minimum 
sentencing, “The sentence is the same, whether one is guilty of a pointless murder in the 
commission of a crime or a tortured woman who withstood unspeakable abuse from her 
husband before she finally snapped and did something she would never be in a position to 
do again.”240
4.  The Case of Nancy Seaman
Nancy Seaman was a devout Catholic, a mother, a fourth grade teacher, and a victim 
of domestic violence.  On May 10, 2004, Seaman killed her husband, Robert, after he cut 
her with a knife and threatened her life—the culmination of thirty years of abuse.  
Seaman grabbed an axe and hacked her husband to death, then cleaned up the mess and 
kept his body wrapped in a tarp in her car for three days.  Seaman was found guilty of 
first degree murder.241  At sentencing, Judge John J. McDonald told Seaman that he 
“didn’t doubt for a minute” that she had been abused and urged her to share her story 
with other battered women so that they would seek help before being faced with a 
situation like Seaman’s, then sentenced her.  “I have no choice but to sentence you to 
mandatory life in prison…I wish you luck.”242  What justification exists for incarcerating 
women like Nancy Seaman and Dixie Shanahan for the rest of their lives?
5.     Mandatory Minimums Undermine the Justice of Punishment
Because the judges in the Shanahan and Seaman cases had no discretion in 
sentencing, there was no justice for these women.  Having been found guilty of second 
240 Bring Sense to Sentencing, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 4, 2004, at 10.
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degree murder, Dixie Shanahan deserved some sort of punishment.  From a retributivist 
perspective, she should have received her just deserts.  From a utilitarian perspective, she 
should have received a punishment that created a greater good for society.  Dixie 
Shanahan’s punishment did neither.  The mandatory minimum sentence meant that Judge 
Smith could not consider what just deserts would mean for Dixie Shanahan, a battered 
woman who killed her long-time abuser in order to save her unborn child.  Instead, Dixie 
Shanahan received the same deserts as every other offender convicted of second degree 
murder—those with no prior histories with their victims, those with lengthy criminal 
records, those who did not have any reason to believe that their lives were in danger.  For 
deserts to be just, they must be individualized; retributivists believe that no two 
punishment should be the same.  Mandatory sentencing precludes judges from engaging 
in that type of analysis.
Mandatory sentences also prevent judges from weighing the costs and benefits of 
incarcerating a particular individual. Judge Smith could not consider whether some other 
punishment—for example, requiring that Dixie Shanahan work on behalf of other 
battered victims and share her story with victims and abusers—would be more likely than 
incarceration to deter other battered women from killing their spouses.  He could not 
determine whether incapacitating Dixie Shanahan would inure to the benefit of society by 
preventing future crime.  He could not weigh the costs of incarcerating Dixie Shanahan—
financial, social and personal—against the benefits to society of some other sentence.
The justice of punishment is intimately tied to understanding the individual offender 
and examining the context for that offender’s actions.  Without discretion to consider 
anything other than the crime itself, judges cannot develop punishments that are just from 
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either a retributivist or a utilitarian perspective.  Mandatory minimums undermine the 
justifications for criminal punishment and result in unjust punishments—as they did in 
the case of Dixie Shanahan. 
The judges in the Shanahan and Seaman cases recognized the fundamental injustice 
of sentencing these women to long prison terms, but were shackled by state mandatory 
minimum sentencing requirements.  But in many other jurisdictions, there are no such 
requirements.  What explains the imposition of unjust sentences in cases involving 
battered women who kill in these other places?
B.  Judicial Unwillingness to Consider Context
Judicial discretion is a necessary but not sufficient element in establishing just 
punishments.  If judges have the discretion to consider the context in which battered 
women kill but refuse to do so, that refusal undermines the justice of punishment just as 
effectively as being fettered by mandatory minimum laws.
Judges can foreclose the introduction of context into sentencing in two ways.  They 
can block the introduction of evidence on domestic violence in the cases of battered 
women who kill.  In the alternative, they can allow such evidence to come in but dismiss
it because they do not believe that the battered woman’s claims are  credible or relevant to 
sentencing.
Since courts and legislatures paved the way for the introduction of evidence on 
battered women’s syndrome in the cases of battered women who killed their abusers, 
pretrial battles about whether defendants can present expert testimony on the applicability 
of the syndrome to their own situations have become common.  Prosecutors routinely 
argue that the defendant does not fit the stereotype of the battered woman described by 
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the syndrome; defense attorneys argue that the syndrome does not describe a prototypical 
victim, but rather a set of behaviors and reactions that are common to women who have 
been abused.243  The verdict in the case of a battered woman who kills is profoundly 
affected by her ability to bring such evidence before the court; that evidence provides the 
context necessary to understand the woman’s perceptions, experiences and choices.  
The decision not to permit such evidence to come before the court can have a 
substantial impact on the justice of punishment as well.  Kathy Thomas shot her 
boyfriend, Reuben Daniels, after Reuben began to severely beat her (not for the first 
time) while she made dinner.  Reuben pushed Kathy from the kitchen onto the living 
room couch, where she found his gun, picked it up and shot him.244 At trial , the judge 
refused to allow two experts to testify about battered women syndrome. Kathy Thomas 
was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to fifteen years to life.245
Would hearing evidence about how enduring four years of repeated severe beatings 
affected Kathy Thomas’ perception of the danger she faced have changed the outcome of 
her case?  That question cannot be answered, but it is fair to say that hearing such 
evidence might have convinced the judge that a lighter sentence was appropriate.  Barring 
evidence about past abuse and the effects of that abuse prevents the judge from 
understanding why the battered woman acted as she did, and therefore crafting a sentence 
243
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tailored to her individual crime.  When sentences are divorced from the experiences of 
the individual offender, the justice of punishment is undermined.
Given changes in the law, as well as a growing awareness of the value of testimony 
on battered woman syndrome, judges are less likely than in the past to prevent such 
evidence from coming in altogether.  Equally damaging to the battered woman’s attempt 
to obtain a just sentence, however, is a judge’s unwillingness to factor the abuse she has 
suffered into her sentence.  Consider, for example, the case of Kosal Pang, who pled
guilty to third degree murder in the death of her husband.246  Pang and her three children 
all described the abuse they endured at the hands of Sokhan Sao.  Their children testified 
that Sao kicked, hit, and dragged Pang by the hair.247  On one occasion, Sao threw boiling 
soup in Pang’s face, injuring her eye.  Sao pistol-whipped his son for being late to 
school.248  Pang, a Cambodian refugee, distrusted the government and would not ask 
police for help.249  Despite this evidence, Judge Bernard Moore sentenced Pang to 10 to 
20 years imprisonment, calling her behavior “outrageous” and stating, “The message to 
society must be that we protect the sanctity of life.”250  Moore may also have been 
swayed by the prosecutor’s argument that Ms. Pang’s claims of abuse were not credible 
because she did not “fit the profile of a battered woman whose life is often controlled by 
her abuser,” since she worked outside of the home, drove a car and had a boyfriend.251
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In contrast, Nancy Gulich had gone to battered women’s shelters and sought medical 
care for the injuries inflicted upon her by her husband, Paul Gulich, before she stabbed 
him in self-defense when he flew into a rage.  Gulich was found guilty of third degree 
murder and sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison—less than the maximum sentence 
of twenty to forty years, but a substantial jail term nonetheless for a 42 year old woman 
with no prior history of violence.  During sentencing, the judge announced that while he 
had considered mitigating evidence—presumably, the violence she endured over time 
and the circumstances surrounding Paul Gulich’s death—he “determined that punishment 
was necessary.”252
Battered women who kill “emphasize the circumstances of their actions, urging the 
criminal justice system to look at the violence they endured, at their inability to separate 
from their batterers, and at the lack of resources or solutions offered to them”—the 
context in which their crimes take place.253 Justice requires not only that judges hear 
evidence about this violence when sentencing battered women who kill, but that they also 
use that evidence to determine what a just desert would be.  Like Dixie Shanahan, these 
women did not receive their just deserts—not because of judges whose discretion was 
fettered, but because of judges whose discretion went unused.
C.  The Myth of the Killing Spree
John MacCormack, Wife Gets60 Year Term for Killing Her Spouse; Jury Convicts Carrizo Springs Widow 
in Less Than 15 Minutes, San Antonio Express-News, January 18, 2005, at B2.  Hernandez acknowledged 
that she shot her husband and that she should be punished, but asked to stay out of prison so that she could 
be with her children.  When asked by the prosecutor, “If you are the victim, then what do you call him, Ms. 
Hernandez?”, she replied, “A victim, too.”  Jesse Bogan, Widow Tells Jury of Spousal Abuse, San Antonio 
Express-News, January 15, 2005, at 3B. 
252
 Debbie Garlicki, Woman Gets 10-20 Years in ’04 Killing; City Resident Was Convicted of Fatally 
Stabbing Husband, Morning Call (Allentown, Pennsylvania), February 2, 2006, at B1.
253 BUSCH, supra note 73, at 67.
59
Recall the words of the Des Moines Register columnist who urged that Dixie 
Shanahan serve a lengthy sentence: “Open a loophole for one woman to kill an abusive 
spouse and pretty soon you’ve got dozens of dead husbands.”254 Is there truth to this 
statement?  Or does it reflect the unfounded fear that abused women everywhere will rise 
up to slay their abusive partners given the chance?
In a number of cases, abused women who have killed their partners have been 
acquitted.255  The media have not reported an uptick in the number of murders of abusive 
partners in those communities.  Just as battered women are unlikely to be deterred from 
killing their abusive partners by the punishment that other women who kill receive, they 
are equally unlikely to kill their partners because other women are acquitted—or receive 
less than the maximum sentence.  Battered women kill in very specific circumstances and 
for very specific reasons.  They kill when their individual assessments of their own 
situations make them believe that they have no other choice but to kill or be killed.256
Luckily, relatively few battered women find themselves in situations that desperate.  
Compared to the number of women in the United States who are battered each year, the 
number of battered women who kill is very small.257
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frequency and were rarely if ever convicted of murder.”  JONES, supra note, at 292.




Look at trends in the homicide rates among intimate partners.  Over the past 30 years, 
the numbers of women being killed by intimate partners has fallen by about 1% per 
year.258  Over that same period of time, however, the numbers of men being killed by 
their partners has declined by four times that amount.259  Of the 1,830 murders 
attributable to intimate partners in 1998, women made up nearly 75% of the victims, an 
increase from just over 50% of all victims of intimate partner murder in 1976.260  The 
decline in the number of men being killed by their abusive partners may be attributable to 
the greater availability of services and supports for battered women.261  Improved service 
provision for battered women provides most women with options other than killing a 
partner to escape an abusive relationship. The notion that battered women are simply 
waiting for a sign in the form of reduced punishment that it is socially acceptable to kill 
their abusers is ridiculous.  But it is also possible that that widely held notion prevents 
judges from imposing just sentences on battered women who kill.
V. Conclusion
Some justification is required before punishing women like Dixie Shanahan—women 
who have brutalized in uncountable ways and who perceive that they have no other 
alternative—for killing their abusers.  Of the theories employed by legal philosophers, 
only retributivism, with its focus on individualized punishment that fits the crime 
committed and the offender who commits that crime, provides sufficient justification for 
punishing these women.  But their just deserts have been denied to Dixie Shanahan, 
Nancy Seaman, Kosal Pang, Nancy Gulich, and countless other battered women forced to 
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make the terrible choice between their own lives and those of their abusers.  Mandatory 
minimum sentences, judicial unwillingness to factor abuse in to punishment, and fears of 
widespread retaliation against abusive partners all contribute to the failure to sentence 
these women in ways commensurate with their crimes.  And because they have not or 
cannot receive their just deserts, there is no justice for battered women who kill.
